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Abstract

This thesis examines the fundamental transformations in

the

American

Constitution

fourteenth amendment.

some

years

the focal

through

the

adoption

of

the

The fourteenth amendment has been for

point of the

debate

about how

the

Constitution should be interpreted.

Chapter One provides a

critique

over

of

jurisprudence.

the

current

debate

original

intent

The end of Chapter One and all of Chapter

Two is spent identifying and analyzing the principles that
the Constitution protects and why it is important to adhere
to those principles.

The final half of the thesis is dedicated to showing
how the transformation occurred, and

how

the use of the

Fourteenth Amendment has brought about changes in the First
Amendment.

The Conclusion is a summary of the results of Judicial
activism and Legislative inaction.
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Modern Day Views Of The American Constitution

Our amended Constitution is the lodestar for

our aspirations.
Like every text worth
reading, it is not crystalline. The phras
ing broad and the limitations of its provi
sions are not clearly marked. Its majestic
generalities and ennobling pronouncements
are

both

luminous

and

obscure.

ambiguity
of
course
calls
interpretation, the interaction
and text.^

This

for
the
of reader

The preceding quotation is Justice William

Brennan's

response on October 12, 1985, to Attorney General Edwin
Meese

Ill's call for a "jurisprudence of original intent".

It is a statement of his judicial philosophy and it illus
trates one side

of a constitutional argument that is now

raging in the United States.

Can our judges today be

expected to render judicial decisions based on the
) our

Constitution?

system,

Or

text of

more accurately, can our judicial

faced with obviously new and unanticipated ques

tions of law in today's

modern world, be expected to give

decisions based on a 200-year-old text?

does not think so.

Justice Brennan

In the same speech again responding to

Meese, the Justice noted that:

There

are

those

who

find

legitimacy

in

fidelity to what they call 'the intentions
of

the Framers.'

In

its most doctrinaire

incarnation, this view demands that Justices
discern exactly what the Framers thought
about the question under consideration and

simply follow that intention in resolving
the

case

before them.

It is a

view

that

feigns self-effacing deference to the
specific judgments to those who forged our

original social compact.
is little more than

But in truth, it

arrogance cloaked as

humility.
It is arrogant to pretend that
from our vantage, we can gauge accurately
the intent of the Framers on application of
principle to specific, contemporary ques
tions.
All too often, sources of potential

enlightenment such as records of the ratifi
cation debates provide sparse or ambiguous
evidence of the original intention.
Typi

cally, all that can be gleaned is that the
Framers themselves did not agree about the

application or meaning of particular consti
tutional provisions, and hid their differ

ences in cloaks of generality.^
The framers had many differences not the least of which
was their

differing views on slavery.

language of the
tence of slavery.

It is true that the

Constitution undeniably allows the exis
How could such a document be at once the

basis for securing individual freedoms and at the same time
allow the existence of slavery?

Justice Brennan's answer to

that question was:
But

our

acceptance

of

the

fundamental

principles [in the Constitution] should not
bind us to those precise, at times an anach
ronistic, contours. Successive generations
of Americans have continued to respect these

fundamental choices and adopt them as their

own guide to evaluating quite different his
torical practices. Each generation has the
choice

to

overrule

or

add

to

the

funda

mental principles enunciated by the Framers;
the Constitution can be amended or it can be

ignored.

. . . The ultimate question must

be what do the words of the text mean in our

time? The genius of the Constitution rests
not in any static meaning it might have had
in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
adaptability of its great principles to cope

with current problems and current needs.^

others in agreement with Justice Brennan, claim that
these same sentiments

years ago.

were held by the Supreme Court 80

Justice McKenna in

Time

Weems v U.S.. held that:

works changes, brings into existence

new conditions and purposes.

Therefore, a

principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth. This peculiarity is true of
constitutions.
They are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meet passing
occasions.
They are, to use the words of
Chief Justice John Marshall, designed to
approach immortality as nearly as human
institutions can approach it.' The future
is their care and provision for events of

good and bad tendencies of which its
prophecy can be made. In application of a
Constitution, therefore, our contemplation
cannot be only of what has been, but of what

may be.^
Another question that needs to be asked is this:

If

the founding fathers actually did expect the Constitution
to be followed as they

originally intended, what was the

ground of thier expectations?

Were they endowed with some

special wisdom that allowed them to invest its practical
expression in the Constitution?

Were they

arrogant enough

to believe that this special wisdom would last

the ages?

throughout

These questions are in part the arguments used to

take the offensive against those who adhere to the doctrine

of original intent.

But, are these arguments valid?

they make historical sense?

Do

It would seem that this

reasoning has been used quite effectively

and not without

some applause from the original intent side. For example in
Brown V Board of Education, which brought about the end of
3

racial segregation in

public schools, both sides approved

of the steps toward equality.

can

be

pointed

to

and

There have been cases that

considered

successes

philosophy opposed to original intent.

for

the

But the facts are

that this philosophy is inadequate and outright wrong when
observed

in

a

closer

way.

statesmen have to say about

Here

is

what

four

great

this philosophy;

'The Constitution is a mere thing of wax in
the hands of the judiciary, which they may
twist and shape into any form they please.'

•If the policy of the Government upon vital
questions affecting the whole people is to
be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme
Court, the instant they are made,
the people will have ceased to be their own
rulers.
'

•The Court has improperly set itself up as a
super-legislature . . reading into the Con
stitution words and implications which are
not there, and which were never intended to
be there . . . We want a

Supreme

Court

which will do justice under the Constitu
tion—not over it.'

•An activist jurisprudence, one which
anchors the Constitution only in the
consciences of jurists, is a chameleon

jurisprudence of changing color and form in
each era.'^
These words sound like those of Edwin Meese.

quotation is the Attorney General's.

The last

But the first comes

from Thomas Jefferson, the second from Abraham Lincoln, and
the third from Franklin

The

quotations

D. Roosevelt.

were

found

in an

Stuart Taylor in Current magazine.
4

article

written

by

He sums up the argument

against Brennan's philosophy this way:

Its scorn

for the 'Original Intention'

approach begs the question of where—if
not
the

from those who wrote
Constitution
and
its

and ratified
amendments—

unelected judges get a mandate to over
ride the will of the political majority
by striking down democratically enacted
laws. The trouble is that judges of all
political stripes have gone beyond the
Constitution's principles to new circum
stances.
They have written their own
moral and political values into it, pre
tending to have found them there. Some
times
they have interpreted the Con
stitution to forbid things explicitly

allowed by its language.®
Lino A. Graglia in a recent Article writes in a
similar verse.
The inevitable

seen

is

that

conclusion that has to be

we

would

no

longer

be

a

government of the people but it boils do
wn to whether, the country should be gov

erned in regard to basic issues of social
policy:
whether
such issues should be
decided by elected representatives of the
people, largely on a state-by-state bas
is, or, as has
been the case for the
last three decades, primarily by a majo

rity of the nine Justices of the

United

States Supreme Court for the nation as a
whole.

. . . nearly every fundamental

change in domestic social policy has been
brought about not by the decentralized
democratic (or, more accurately, repub
lican) process contemplated by the Con
stitution, but simply by the Court's de—
cree. The Court has decided on a nation
al basis and often in opposition to the

wishes of a majority of the American
people, issues literally of life and
death, as in its decisions invalidating
virtually all restrictions on abortion
and severely restricting the use of

capital punishment.^

Graglia goes on to list additional social implica
tions handed down by the Court, such as expansion of
criminal

rights, limiting state power to control street

demonstrations, vagrancy,

obscenity,
schools,

nudity,

busing,

public morality, pornography,

school

prayer,

reapportionment,

aid

to

libel,

religious

slander,

and

many others.
It would seem clear that the founders did have an

original

intention in writing the Constitution.

not intended to be an

It was

exercise in futility that they

remained in isolation during the summer of 1787

while

hashing out their differences and finally coming to a
consensus.

They indeed had a plan and an understanding

of how the government should
that it needed to rest on.

work and of the principles
That is where the

division

and misunderstanding stems from as far as this constitu
tional

debate of original intention is concerned.

Brennan

believes

nothing more than
pronouncements."

that

the

Constitution

rests

on

"majestic generalities and ennobling
In other words, the Constitution means

what the justices say it means at any particular time*
It is a changing, organic document that can mean one

thing one day and something else the next.

To quote Lino

Graglia again.
The central question presented by con
stitutional law—the only question the

great

variety

of

matters

dealt

with

under that nubric have in common—is how,

if at all, can such power in the hands of
national officials who are unelected and

effectively hold office for life be jus
tified in a system of government sup

posedly republican in form and federalist
in organization?
That notion that a
court has 'power to overrule or control
the

action

of

the

people's

representa

tives,' Justice Owen Roberts confirmed
during the New Deal Constitutional
Crisis, is a misconception; the Court's
only function in a constitutional case is
to lay the article of the Constitution
which

is

involved

beside

the

statute

which is challenged and to decide
whether the latter squares with the
former.®
What then does the Constitution rest on?

What is

the philosophy behind it?

The Constitution, I believe, rests on the foundation

provided for it in the

Declaration of Independence which

says, "We hold these truths to be

self-evident, that all

men are created equal, that they are endowed by
Creator with certain inalienable rights.

life,

Among them is

liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

it mean to say that

their

What does

all men are created equal?

A member of the Constitutional Convention and a

leading Federalist,

James Wilson, remarked that.

Between beings, who in their nature,
powers, and situation are so perfectly
equal, that nothing can be ascribed to
one, which is not applicable to the
other.

There can be neither superiority

nor dependence with regard to such
beings, no reason can be assigned, why
anyone should assume authority over
others, which may not, with equal propri
ety, be assigned, why each of those

others should assume authority over that
one.
To constitute superiority and
dependence, there must be an essential
difference of qualities on which those

relations may be founded.^

This

is

not

to

inequalities among
would

make

one

say

that

there

are

no

natural

humans, only that there are none that

being

a

natural

ruler

over

another.

People are to be treated, and to treat others, in

such a

way as to honor these natural rights granted to them by
their

Creator, as the Declaration asserts.

As Harry V. Jaffa writes in an article published in
the Harvard Journal

of Law and Public Policv;

One should not speak of the 'values' of
the
Constitution, for the Constitution
rests upon principles, which are an enti

rely different animal. The confusion of
principles with values —
which in the
language of the present day philosophy
[i.e. Justice
Brennan] and social
science means essentially something
subjective, is a symptom of the disease
from which we suffer, and which, to some
extent,
makes conservatives not much
more constructive than their political

opponents.^®
Our government, our regime, is based on the natural
rights

philosophy,

and

to

say

that

relevance today is to stray far off the

worst to jeopardize our system of law.

they

have

no

path and at

Things do change,

and to no one's surprise, the founders could not have

anticipated

everything

that

8

has

happened

since

the

founding.
advances

They could not have seen all the technological
such

as

cars,

airplanes,

or

space

flight,

therefore, it would have been impossible for them to have

addressed those specific issues.

But I disagree with the

opponents of original intention when they say that the
principles. need to be changed with the passage of time.

It

was true 200 years ago that man was entitled to life,

liberty and the

pursuit of happiness.

and it will be true a thousand

It is true today,

years from now.

Graglia has written that.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized,
therefore, that the Constitution we
actually have bears almost no relation
to, and is often clearly irreconcilable
with
the
Constitution
of
Justice
Brennan's vision.
No more is necessary
to rebut all contemporary defenses
of

judicial activism that a copy of the Con
stitution be kept close at
hand to
demonstrate

that

the

defenders

judicial activism are invariably

of

relying

on something else.^^
Abraham Lincoln, who understood the Constitution better

than almost anyone before or since, said that:
Without the Constitution and the Union,
we could not have attained the result:
but even these are not the cause of our

great

prosperity.

There

is something

back of these, entwining itself more
closely about the human heart, that some

thing

is

the

principle

of

Liberty

to

all—the principle that clears the path
for all—gives hope to all—and, by con

sequence, enterprise and industry to all.

The expression of that principle, in our
Declaration

of

Independence,

was

most

happy and fortunate . . . The assertion
of that principle, at that time, was the

word 'fatally spoken,' which has proved
an 'apple of gold' to us. The Union, and
the Constitution, are the pictures of

silver, subsequently framed around it.
The picture was made, not to conceal, or
destroy the apple; but to adorn and pre
serve it.
The picture was made for the
apple, not the apple for the picture.

What Lincoln was explaining, was the genius behind the
Constitution and the Union.

are honored as they are is

The reason natural rights

because of the principle of

equality expressed in the Declaration of Independence.
The principle was to be enshrined by the Constitution,
and

not the other way around.

To summarize this first section, it can be said that

according to

Justice

William Brennan

and those that

agree with him, the Constitution is based on ennobling
values and grand generalities.
can,

at

best,

be

glimpsed

The framers' intentions

and,

at

disregarded by the current generation.
during this

worst,

completely

Crises occurring

period of time need to be resolved based on

what seems right to the judge and does not necessarily
need to be connected

principally to the Constitution.

Over and against this thesis presented by the opponents

of "original intention," are the arguments for original
intention that

claim to be able to understand, not per

fectly, but with a certain degree of certainty, the
principles that the framers were trying to enshrine in
the Constitution.

Those principles, known as natural

10

rights,

can

be

understood

and

legal cases.

11

applied

to

modern-day

Brinciples of Equality

Another issue in the debate is the argument of those

who adhere to

original intent that the judicial activism

of the Court has usurped the proper constitutional auth

ority of the legislature.

Both conservatives, in the

laissez-faire era of the 1890-1930s, and the liberals in

the 1950-70S who sought a broad application of the Bill
of

Rights

ot

the

States,

have

used

the

shortcut around the legislative branch.

Court

as

a

According to

Hamilton in Federalist paper No. 78, the judiciary has

the distinct purpose of interpretation and clarification;
to tell us what the laws mean.

function

between

the

people

and

It serves a moderating

its

government.

To

quote Hamilton,
it serves to moderate the immediate

mischiefs of those which may have been
passed but it operates as a check upon

the legislative body in passing them.^^
But the court has subtly moved from a position of clari

fying and interpreting the laws written by the legisla
ture to interpret the laws according to the judges per
sonal

beliefs.

These

supralegislative

forays

by the

Court into our political process have resulted in a group

of nine justices and its elected officials leading the
country, by decree instead of by popular vote.
Whether right or wrong, the Court has also found

12

significant new principles in the Constitution that
cannot, by any stretch, be implied by the framers.

For

example, the incorporation of the Bill of Rights by the
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

Leonard

W. Levy, writing in The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill
of

Rights: the Incorporation Theory. says this about

Charles Fairman's research concerning the incorporation
theory;

Fairman
Black

reviewed the same history that

had

reversed

and came to the con

clusion that the record 'overwhelmingly'

refuted Blacks incorporation thesis. In
addressing himself to the immediate back
ground of the amendment, Fairman did not
only analyze the congressional debates,
he also explored the newspapers, the 1866

campaign speeches of significant members
of congress, the gubernatorial messages
calling for state consideration of the
proposed amendment, and the records of
state ratifying legislatures. The evide
nce dictated his finding that Congress
and the Country, in framing and ratifying
the

amendment,

did

not understand

that

Section one incorporated the first eight
Amendments, that in fact they had no
clear Understanding of the meaning of the
Amendment's trilogy, taken separately or
together.
What was clear was only that
Negroes were to have the same civil righ
ts as white men and that the states could

not deny the rights undefined and un
enumerated, of United States Citizenship.
14

Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in a 1833 case
of Barron vs. Baltimore. forty years after the

Constitutional

Convention,

addressed

the

question

of

incorporation by reiterating that the Federal Constitu

13

tion did

not apply to the states. So, based on the

court's actions before the fourteenth amendment, and the

historical record during the ratification process, the

incorporation theory as advanced by the Court in the last
ninety

years

framers.

is

not

grounded

in

the

intent

of the

The question then is who is responsible to

bring about social change?
Justice William Brennan in a recent speech says this
about the Court's role in societal change.

Unabashed enshrinement of majority will,
would permit the imposition of a social
caste system or wholesale confiscation of

property so long as a majority of the
authorized legislative body, fairly
elected, is approved.
Our Constitution
could not abide such a situation.

It is

the very purpose of a constitution, and
particularly of the Bill of Rights, to
declare

certain

values

transcendent,

beyond the reach of temporary political

majorities.^®
Justice Brennan believes that the court is the agent that

accomplishes these changes in society.

Brennan sees the

court as providing the just remedies for these excesses

of the legislative process.

The framers, though, did

intend those that come after them to look back and follow

the principles they enshrined in the Constitution.

The

evidence that they believed this is the fact that the
Constitution

was written

down.

The oath taken by the

President, members of Congress and the Supreme Court all

dictate that they uphold the Constitution.
14

Ideally, all

laws violating the spirit and the letter of the Constitu
tion would be nullified.

These and others prove the

point that the Constitution was held above other law.
That is not to say that the Framers were not realists.
In fact, indirect constitutional recognition of slavery

was a concession by the framers

because of political

necessity to get the Constitution ratified.

If slavery

had not been allowed in the Constitution, there was a

good chance it may have not been ratified by the southern
states.

But slavery had already been put on the road to

extinction with the passage of the Northwest Ordinance of
1787.

This ordinance outlawed slavery in the territories

northwest of the Ohio River so that it would not spread.

So began the principle that slavery was the exception and
freedom the rule.

The principles of equality or the "standard maxim"
that Lincoln referred to have always been a part of this

regime.
have

The idea that opponents of original intention

the

idea

that

the

Constitution

does

not

address

those kinds of issues, so principles perceived as not

existing in it need to be created in order to address

certain problems existing in society.
clear from all the sources

If anything was

at the time of the revolu

tion, it was the general sentiment that the people had
to create

a

new

government that secured liberty from

tyranny, and that its principles would be enduring for
15

ages to come.

The Declaration of Independence is the

most obvious evidence of these facts.

in the next chapter, I will deal with the question
of what these principles were and if they really are
part of the Constitution.

16

The American Constitution:

A Document Designed to Protect Principles of Equality

The principles enshrined in our Constitution came
from

somewhere.

It was

Abraham

Lincoln's

contention

that the principles enshrined in the Constitution are
found in the Declaration of Independence.

In one of his

debates with Stephen Douglas, Lincoln said:
Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in
the Dred Scott case, admits that the

language of the Declaration is broad
enough to include the whole human family,
but he and Judge Douglas argue that the
authors of that instrument did not intend

to include Negroes, by the fact that they
did not at once actually place them on an

equality with the whites. Now this grave
argument comes to just nothing at all, by
the

other

fact,

that

they

did

not at

once, or ever aftejrwards, actually place

all white people on an equality with one
another.
of

both

And this is the staple argument
the

Chief

Justice

and

the

Senators, for doing this obvious violence
to the plain unmistakable language of the
Declaration.

notable

I think the authors of that

instrument

intended

to

include

all men, but they did not intend to decl
are all men are equal in all respects.
They did not mean to say all were equal
in color, size, intellect, moral develop

ment, or social capacity.

They defined

with
tolerable distinctness, in what
respect they did consider all men created

equal.
Equal in 'certain inalienable
rights, among which are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness.' This they
said and this they meant.
They did not
mean to assert the obvious untruth, that

all were then actually enjoying that
equality, nor yet that they were able to
confer it immediately upon them.
In
fact, they had no power to confer such a
17

boon. They meant simply to declare the
right, so that the enforcement of it
might follow as fast as circumstances
should permit.
They meant to set up a
standard maxim for free society which
could be familiar to all, and revered by
all, constantly looked to, constantly
labored for, and even though never per

fectly attained, constantly approximated,
and thereby constantly spreading and
deepening its influence, and augmenting

the happiness and value of life to all
people of all colors everywhere.
The

Constitution

is

an

embodiment

of

these

principles, not only does it contain them but it provides
the organization to protect them.

The Constitution was

designed to be the instrument or haven for all of the

natural

rights

possessed

Constitution was to

by

its

citizens.

The

act as a servant of the people and

provide a means of securing them natural rights.

The

framers of the Constitution clearly recognized that human

beings

by

their

very

inalienable rights.

nature

were

entitled

to

these

These rights were entitled to the

people, according to Thomas Jefferson, by "the laws of
Nature and Nature's God."^^
The

historical events that helped form the Decla

ration and Constitution was the national environment that

surrounded the revolution in the years just prior to it.

The influence of the enlightenment and a great religious
awakening helped

shape the colonists' minds during the

middle part of the 1700s.

Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke and Montesquieu
18

influenced to no small degree the framers of the Declara
tion and the

Constitution.

had this to say about the

In fact, Thomas Jefferson

Declaration:

[The Declaration] was intended to be an
expression Of the American mind, and to
give to that expression the proper tone
and spirit
called for by the occasion.
All its authority rests then on the
harmonizing of the sentiments of the day,

whether
letters,

expressed in conversation,
printed essays, or in the

elementary books of

public right, as

Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc.^®
The

enlightenment thinking

was

only

one

part

catalyst that helped form the Constitution.

of

the

The other

was the general religious awakening of the time.
In the introduction of his book. The First Amend
ment. T. Daniel Shumate wrote:

Three phenomena affected all the colonies
during the 18th
Century:
The Great
Awakening, beginning in New England and
stimulating

evangelization

elsewhere;

Anglican efforts to establish episcopacy
in the

colonies; and the Enlightenment.

19

These two agents, the Enlightenment and the great reli

gious

awakening

caused

a

general

backlash

against

anything perceived by the colonists as tyranny.

It is

also true that as the "experiment" with republicanism

persisted, it became evident to the Framers that a

government protecting the natural rights of its citizens
was a regime that

would be obeyed and honored.

A civil society based on these fundamental prin
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ciples functioned

better than

acknowledge or respect thein.

societies that did

not

Although the Declaration

says that these truths are self-evident, and all men are
created equal, it took a long time to lay them out in a
written

form,

and

even

longer to

create

a

government

that protected and respected them.

During

the

interim

between

the

Declaration

of

Independence and the creation of the Constitution, the
Articles

of

Confederation

held

the

states

together.

Many problems developed during the interim which could
not be addressed effectively through the Articles.

The inability of the Confederation to raise funds was one
of its most persistent problems.
back

foreign

countries

the

money

during the Revolutionary War.

It was unable to pay
that

were

borrowed

The Confederation was also

unable to pay back its own citizens for debts incurred

during the war.

In

addition, the territories, which

should have rightfully been handed over to the states by

England after the war, were still in British hands.

Not

only were the outposts and territories being held but
there was absolutely no power of retribution since no
troops could be enlisted.
Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, wrote
that

the

main

vice

of

the

Confederation

was

"the

principle of legislation for states or governments, in
their

corporate

or

collective
20

capacities,

as

con

tradistinguished from the individuals of which they con
sist."20
He was arguing that the Confederation, in principle

was wrong, because it could

directly.
he

not deal

with

a

citizen

Its only power extended to the state in which

resided.

The

Confederation,

therefore,

could

not

exercise any effective power but was restricted to mere
recommendations which the states could observe or disre

gard.

The

issues

of

an

ineffective

Confederation,

the

desire of the people to secure their natural rights, the
Enlightenment and religious revival of the 1700s, all
caused the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

The dele

gates were faced with providing the nation with a fomn of
government

that

was

energetic

and

representative

to

secure liberty, yet powerful enough and responsive enough

to protect the citizens' natural rights.
Was

the

Constitution

rights philosophy?

the

product

Undoubtedly it was.

of

a

natural

But arguments

have been proposed which claim that it could not possibly
have been so.

We need not look too much farther than

Justice Brennan to find this argument against the natural

rights philosophy.

He has said that "Typically, all

that can be gleaned is that

the framers themselves did

not agree about the application or meaning of particular
constitutional provisions, and hid their differences in
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cloaks

of generality."

And, "Each generation has the

choice to overrule or add to the fundamental principles

enunciated by the framers; the Constitution can be amend
ed or it can be ignored.
But the facts are that even
did

not

even

undergirding

debate

our

as

to

our founding fathers

the

fundamental

Constitution.

principle

Thomas Jefferson, the

architect of our Declaration of Independence, which en
shrined natural rights at the beginning of that document
to the standard any legitimate government should be de

signed to protect, was in wholehearted agreement with
the

principles

enunciated

in

the

Constitution.

When

Madison sent a draft of the Constitution to him while an

ambassador to France, he agreed with Madison that, "If

they approve the proposed convention in all its parts, I

shall concur in it cheerfully,"^2
John Jay in Federalist Paper No. 2 makes it clear
that

his

squarely

assumption

on

the

is

that

principle

the

of

Constitution

natural

rights

rests

and

a

limited government to protect those rights when he wrote.
Nothing is more certain than the indis
pensable necessity of government, and it
is equally undeniable that whenever and
however
must

it

cede

is

to

it

instituted,
some

of

the

their

rights in order to vest it with

people
natural

requi

site powers.

In fact, in arguing against adding a Bill of
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Rights, Alexander Hamilton says.
For why declare that things shall not be
done which there

is no power to do?

The

truth is, after all the declarations we
have heard, that the Constitution is it
self, in every rational sense and every

useful purpose> a Bill of Rights.^4
What

Hamilton

Constitution

was

saying

in

essence

is

that

the

protected the public's natural rights in

two significant ways.

One way was by actually writing

into the body of the Constitution fundamental principles
or natural rights that could never be violated such as
the

establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohi

bition of ex-post-facto laws and of titles of nobility.
The other way it protected the citizens•

natural

rights was by never addressing the subject of certain
natural

rights,

such

as

freedom

of

the

press.

For

example, nowhere in the body of the Constitution is there
any language expressly securing the freedom of religion.
Because of the principle of a limited government, which

meant that the people ceded to government only certain
natural rights as its responsibility, there was no need
to

write

into

the

Constitution

a

freedom

of

religion

clause since that right was never given to it to protect.
There are those who could argue that the Constitution
when drafted the summer of 1787 was not in its complete
form because later a Bill of Rights was added.

fail to bring up the point that one of the
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But they

strongest

reasons for

attaching the

protect freedom

as

much

Federalists to defuse an

Bill

of Rights was

not to

as that it was used

by the

attempt by the Antifederalists

to discredit the constitution.

James

Madison took the

lead in drafting the bill so that he could defuse the
AntiFederalists' attack, so he could provide the groundwork
for a Bill of Rights if there was to be one.

Not

only

did

our

founding

fathers

see

that

the

Constitution embodied natural rights, it is also clear
that Abraham Lincoln clearly saw that fact also. While

debating Stephen Douglas, Lincoln made this point about
natural rights:
All honor to Jefferson-—to the man who,

in the concrete

pressure of a

struggle

for national independence by a single
people, had the coolness, forecast and
capacity to introduce into a merely
revolutionary document, an
abstract
truth, applicable to all men and all times
and so to embalm it there, that today and

in all coming days it shall be a rebuke
and stumbling block to the very harbinger
of reappearing tyranny and oppression. That
abstract or universal principle is that
all men are created equal.

That principle, of course, is the principle of equality
and natural

rights.

Lincoln saw our Constitution as an

instrument to secure those natural rights. He knew that

without

this

principle,

this

basis,

our

Constitution

could be construed as having any meaning the judiciary

may

want.

In fact, at the time Lincoln was debating
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Douglas, the effects of the Dred Scott case were increas
ing

the

tension

between

the

North

and

the

South.

Lincoln fought the Civil War, to restore the foundation
of the Constitution—the Declaration of Independence.

But at the same time another philosophy called positivism
gained popular appeal.

Stephen
is

a

qlassic

Douglas' doctrine of popular sovereignty
example

of the

positivistic

philosophy.

Was slavery to be introduced into the territories, or was

it to be kept out?

According to the doctrine of popular

sovereignty, the people had to decide the issue.

The

decision to allow slavery into the territories was not
based on the fundamental principle of equality and the

natural rights of every human being but on what society
determined

practical

was right or wrong.

approach to a

problem

So positivism is the

based

on

human

will

rather than on a fundamental principle.
William

Brennan's

from Stephen Douglas•.

philosophy

is

not

far

removed

Although Stephen Douglas fought

for the principle of majority rule and Justice Brennan
for personal rights based on human principles, they each

argued, one by majority rule and the other by Judicial
rule,

that "human

will" at any

particular time

in

history determines what policy government should follow.

In summary, it can be seen that our founding fathers,
as well as others down through the ages including Abraham
25

Lincoln, perceived that our

Constitution rested on the

fundamental principles enshrined in the
Independence.

Rights.

Declaration of

These principles were known as Natural

But soon after the Civil War, the new philosophy

of positivism became popular and that has proved to have
an enduring quality up to and including today.
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The Transformation of the American Constitution

Through the Fourteenth Amendment

Nowhere can the change in our Constitution be seen
more clearly than in the use of the 14th Amendment.

Was

it to be used, as some say, to incorporate the Bill of
Rights

and

apply them to the states?

There are, of

course, arguments presented by both sides wishing to
prove their thesis.

For example, Michael Keith Curtis in

his book. No State Shall Abridge, sets forth his arguments
for the incorporation theory, while Raoul Berger in his
book

Government

side,

arguing

bv

that

the

the

Judiciarv.

Fourteenth

takes

opposite

Amendment

supposed to be incorporated to the States.

amendment designed to do?

the

was

not

What was the

Without a doubt, it was

de

signed to recognize the black man's inalienable right of
equality,

and

to secure

his

natural

rights

of

life,

liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
To understand whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment

was supposed to incorporate the Bill of Rights to the
States, it is important to understand that period
time.
was

of

It is an unquestionable fact that the Constitution

an

rights.

instrument

that

was

meant

to

secure

natural

It is also true that it assumed slavery existed,

and made references to that institution.

Also, it is

clear that the men who framed the Constitution were well
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aware of the incongruency of these two doctrines.

These

men, the Framers as Lincoln asserted, did not leave the
institution of slavery to itself.

they made its extension into

By an act of Congress

illegal territories.

It

is also clear that because of issues like slavery and
mistrust of a national government, the Federal Government
was

created

with

substantial

limits,

while

the

state

governments retained a considerable degree of power.
Over the next decades the debate over whether or not

slavery should

be allowed into the territories became

more and more an issue.

allow

slavery

into

This issue of whether or not to

the

territories

soon

raised

the

question of states rights and ultimately climaxed in the
Lincoln-Douglas debates.

Lincoln held that the principles

enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, of equality
was of more fundamental importance then that of Popular

sovereignty.

Adding

to

these

facts

was

the

Supreme

courts offensive attempt to define the black man as a

piece

of

property.

With

these

important

historical

facts in mind the question of what was the Fourteenth

Amendment

designed

to

become

was

somewhat

easier

to

answer. Raoul Berger, in his book Government bv Judiciary,

points out numerous
amendment

quotations

by those debating the

that make it clear that they were discussing

the constitutionalizing of natural rights for all people,

and specifically of the black man.
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Berger cites person

after

person,

who

during

the

debates

surrounding

the

ratification to the Amendment, state that they do not see

the

Amendment

incorporating

the

Bill of Rights.

For

example, George R. Latham of West Virginia stated that:
"the

civil rights bill which is now a law covers exactly

the same ground as

this amendment ^^

In the first

section Berger points out in other examples the Framers
were clear that it was natural rights they were talking
about.

Some of the examples stated were, "the

rights I

stated

in

the (Civil

Rights)

enumerated

bill

were

the

fundamental rights of citizenship,"27 said Martin Thayer
of Pennsylvania.
Are these fundamental rights talked about by Martin

Thayer the same as the natural rights in the Declaration

of Independence?

Representative Wilson asked the same

question, and in his description, he seems to come to
that conclusion:

What do these terms mean?
Do they mean
that
in all things, civil, social,

political,
tinction

equal?

By

construed,

citizens
their

all
of

citizens,
race

ho

means

nor

shall

or

do

children

can

they

sit on
shall

without

color,

dis

shall

they

be

be

so

mean

that

juries,

or

that

the

same

attend

all

schools.
These are not civil rights and
immunities. Well, what is the meaning?
What are Civil Rights? I understand
civil rights do be simply the absolute
rights of individuals, such as the right
of personal security/ the right of
personal liberty, and the right
to
acquire and enjoy property.
The use of
these words are closely related to the
29

exact

words

used

in

the

Declaration

of

Independence describing natural rights.
Michael Curtis, on the other hand, views the debates

in a different way.

In his book. No State Shall Abridge,

he takes a different perspective on the incorporation

theory.

He

maintains

that

James

Madison

had

the

incorporation theory in mind when he purposed the Bill of

Rights.

Curtis !explains that Madison was won over by

Jefferson to believe that with a Bill of Rights attached
to

the

would

Constitution

establish

a

the

citizens

bulwark

of

against

the

United

state

and

encroachment on their fundamental rights.

States

federal

Madison, was

actually conceeding a point to the states.

He, being a

realist, knew that without a Bill of Rights the states

would probably not ratify the Constitution because of
their

fear

of

"the

new

federal

government.

In

fact

Curtis, concedes I that the evidence seems to indicate
that incorporation was not the desired end, but that the
fact of the matter is different because of new facts he
■

1

has uncovered.

■

He asserts that the republicans especially

Representative

Bingham,

who

authored

the

Amendment, viewed:it as an incorporation tool.
after time the

record

clearly the opposite.

Fourteenth

But time

indicates that the sentiment was

For example, M. Russell Thayer of

Pennsylvania said,
I

...to
what

avoid any misapprehension as
the
fundamental rights
30

to
of

citizenship are, they are stated in the
bill. The same section goes on to define
what were the civil rights and immunities
which are to be protected by the bill.
When those civil rights, which are first
referred to in general terms (that is,

civil rights and immunities) are subse
quently ; enumerated, that enumeration
precludes any possibility that the
general words which have been used can be
extended beyond the
particular which
have been enumerated.

That the bill was

for the protection of the fundamental
rights of citizenship and nothing else."
29

Also James Patterson of New Hampshire, noted;

I am opposed, to any law discriminating
against [blacks] in the security of life,
liberty, 'property and the proceeds of
their labor.
These civil
rights all
should enjoy.
Beyond this I am not
prepared to go, and those
pretended

friends who urge political and social
equality are the worst enemies of the
colored race.^^
The framers !were talking about equality in natural

rights and that is where they stopped.
also supported by history.
and

even

somehow

the

North

incorporating

was

the

These facts

are

The Civil War had just ended
perplexed

Negroes

at

its

dilemma

into society.

of

The

North, who supposedly treated Negroes as equal had

segregation laws in effect and only a two states allowed
them to vote.
The

According to Roscoe Conkling,

northern states, most

not permit Negroes to vote.

repeatedly and

of them, do

Some of them

lately pronounced against

it. Therefore, even if it were defensible
as a principle for the Central Govern
ment to absorb by Amendment the power to
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control

the

action

of

the

states

in

such a matter, would it not be futile to
ask three-quarters of the States to do
for themselves and others, by ratifying
such an Amendment, the very thing most of
them have already refused to do in their
own cases?"^^

From these examples and others it can be seen that

the scope of the amendment was narrow in its application.
It extended to -the ex-slaves the natural rights of all
men

but did not go any further.

The issue of whether the

bill of Rights should be incorporated by the amendment
as not included in its meaning.

The goal and purpose of

the Constitution of 1787 was to establish equality, but

the

Fourteenth

amendment,

which

continued

to

expand

equality, was not supposed to be used by the court to
incorporate the Bill of Rights and apply them to the
states.

Section I of the fourteenth amendment it says:

All persons born or
United

States,

jurisdiction
the

United

Naturalized in the

and

subject

to

the

thereof, are citizens of
States,

and

subject to

the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State

wherein

they reside.
No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States.
Nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property,
without due process of law;

nor any <Jeny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
■|

It

is

fairly

certain that

the Framers'

view

on what

equal protection of the laws meant was that the Negro's
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natural rights were included but his political rights

were not.

If Negro suffrage had been included another

amendment would not have been needed.

Senator Hendrick,

an Indiana Democrat:

To
recognize the Civil rights of the
colored people as equal to the Civil
rights of the white people, I understand
to be as far as Senators desire
to go;
in the language of the Senator from
Massachusetts (Sumner) to place all men
upon an equality before the law, and

that is ; proposed in regard to
civil rights, (natural rights).
James W. Patterson of New

their

Hampshire was "opposed to

any law discriminating against (blacks) in the security
and

protection of life, liberty, person and property,

beyond

this I am no prepared to go', explicitly reject

ing political and social

equality.

It is true that

the amendment was meant to do away with the black codes
that had been legislated in the States.

But to say that

the amendment was designed to redefine the relationship
between the National government and the State government

would be wrong.

The emphasis was to remedy and extend

the original constitutiori's privileges and immunities to
all of the citizens not just the white man.

It is

also clear that the framers did not see the amendment as

a

way for

states.

congress to legislate its will over the

In fact it was the opposite they felt that the

existence of the states with power

local

government

was

essential

i

33

to

for domestic and

the

working

of

government.

As

I

mentioned

earlier,

in

Barren

v.

!

Baltimore. Chief Justice Marshall says after a discussion
of

nation-state

correct,

the

relations, "If

fifth

amendment

these

must

propositions be

be

understood

as

restraining the power of the general government, not as

applicable to

the States."

It is

universally

And he continues.
understood,

it is

a

part of the history of the day, that the
great revolution which established the
constitution of the United States was not

effected without immense opposition.
Serious fears were extensively enter
tained that those powers which the
patriot states men who then watched over
the interests of our Country, deemed
essential to Union, and to the attainment

of those invaluable objects for which the
Union sought, might be exercised in a
manner daingerous to liberty.
In almost
every convention by which the constitution

was adoptied, amendments to guard against
the abuse of power were recommended.
These
amendments
demanded
security
against the apprehended encroachments of

the general government not against those

of the local governments.^^
The Framers of the Fourteenth amendment understood

that the meaning of the amendment applies to states in a
I

very

narrow

rights,

but

way.-

to|

It was

require

not to

that

confer

whatever

or

regulate

rights

and

I

obligations were imposed by the states, those should be
without distinction based on race.

way refute or overrule Barron.
of Rights to be placed on the

This did not in any

He did not allow the Bill
States.

The amendment

extended the states obligation to equal protection of
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natural

rights

to

Negroes.

In

view

of the

limited

objectives of sepuring life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness or natural rights to Negroes, how has the

amendment undergone such change?

They did not intend

the amendment to become such a broad, general catch-all.

Was it wrong that the amendment did not provide full
equality?

Probably so but it was as far as they could go

politically at that period of history.

In summing up, Berger who holds the perspective that
the Fourteenth Amendment was a step toward equality but
not full equality is probably the closest to the truth.
There are too many clear facts, such as the clear records

of the debate, the passage of an additional amendment,
i

■

,

■

the situation on' inequality in the northern state, the

Supreme Court readings prior to the amendment that make

arguments such as Curtis•; difficult to defend.
does however, make arguments like:
The idea that the constitution protected
fundamental liberties of citizens against
state action was accepted by republicans
of all pplitical persuasion.
Its most
ardent exponent was John Bingham, a
conservative to centrist republican.

Bingham'Si greatest problem in getting the
final draft of his proposal for a
Fourteenth Amendment accepted was not
that it departed from what Republicans
thought appropriate.
It was that many
republicans had so convinced themselves
of

the

tional

correctness

views

Fourteenth

that

of

they

their

constitu

considered

Amendment superfluous.

the
They

thought blacks were already citizens;
that States were already prohibited from
35

Curtis

depriving

free

persons

of due

process;

that alli the privileges or immunities or
rights of American Citizens protected
them throughout the nation, even in the
South.36

Even though a majority of the republicans thought
that, the final effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was not

supposed to be incorporation.
1875

a

Constitutional

Just a few years later in

Amendment

was

brought

forward,

called the Elaine Amendment proposing aid to religion.
It was defeated by the Senate never making it to the state
legislators for ratification.

Why would the House have

asked for a Constitutional Amendment to aid religion if

the Fourteenth Amendment had been meant to incorporate

the Bill of Rights?

The only answer can be that it did

not mean for it to incorporate the Bill of Rights.

The

framers of the amendment went as far as they could go.

They moved toward the standard maxim but did not attain
it.

Were they naive to think that with such a narrow

construction

of !the

amendment

problem of inequality?

of

the

Congress

could

solve

the

On the basis of recent Supreme

Court rulings it ;would seem so.

failure

they

It is evident that the

to legislate

effectively

has

caused the Supreme Court to legislate unilaterally its
own

will.

By

looking

at the

transformation

of

the

amendment over the last 100 years, it can be seen how
this has occurred.

The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 hinged on the question
'
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of whether or not Congress could pass legislation giving

any person the full and equal enjoyment of accoitonodation,
advantages, facilities, and privileges, based on Section
I and Section V of the amendment.

Until

The court held that:

some state law has been passed, or

some state action through its officers or
agents has been taken, adverse to the
rights of citizens sought to be protected
by the amendment, no legislation of the
United states under said amendment, nor
any proceeding under such legislation,
can be called into activity, for the
prohibitions of the amendment are
against state laws and acts done under
state authority.
Justice Bradley goes on to state that:

The wrongful act of an individual,
unsupported by any such authority, is
simply a private
wrong, or an crime of
that

individual;

an

invasion

of

the

rights of; the injured party, it is true,
whether they affect his person, his
property, i or his reputation, but if not
sanctioned in some way by the state, or
not done; under state authority, his
rights remain in full force, any may
presumably be indicated by resort to the
laws of the state for redress.

Also in an earlier case, called the Slaughterhouse
Casaes. it was held that the amendment was not intended

to extend to legislation granting exclusive franchises
within the state of Louisiana.
We

do

not

see

in

To quote Justice Miller:
those

amendments

(Thirteenth and Fourteenth) any purpose
to
destroy the main features of the
general system.
Under the pressure of
all the excited feeling growing out of
the war, our statesman still
believe

i
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that

the: existence

of

the

states

with

powers for domestic and local government,

including the regulation of civil rights,
the rights
of person and of property,
was essential to the perfect working of
our
complex form of government, though

they have thought proper to impose addi
tional limitations on the states, and to
confer additional power on that of the
nation.

In

these

two

cases,

one

starts

to

see

that

the

limited, narrow construction of the amendment which the
framers intended produced results that were not altogether
i

equitable.

But again the issue was two-fold.

Would the

legislative branch do what it needed to do by passing
legislation to shore up the amendment's true meaning, or
would it abdicate it rightful obligation and allow the
court to create social change?
Because the states were seen as the final authority

over its own citizens, the inequality of their laws were
not overruled.

This can be seen even better in Plessv v.

Ferguson, which established the doctrine of separate but
equal.

In Plessv; Justice Brown wrote.

The object of the Amendment was
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law,
but, in the nature of things, it could
not

have been intended to abolish dis

tinctions based upon color, or to
force social, as distinguished

en
from
political, equality, or a commingling of
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory

to either.

He

went on to list the circumstances permitting and
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even

requiring the separation of the races, [such as

public facilities, schools, marriage and theaters].

"If

one race is inferior to the other socially, the constitu
tion of the United States cannot put them upon the same

plane.

These cases to be sure, were not all the court

had to say about the amendment.

In an opinion given in

1880 a black man, Strauder, sought to have his murder
trial removed to a federal court since West Virginia law

did

not permit negroes to be eligible for service on

petit juries.

The Supreme Court sustained Strauder's

request and, through Justice Strong said;
The

words

necessary

of

the

amendment

implication

of

contain

a

a

positive

immunity or right, most valuable to the
colored race, the right to exemption
from unfriendly legislation against them

distinctly as colored - exemption from
legal distinctions, implying inferiority
in civil society, lessening security of
their enjoyment of the rights which
others enjoy, and discriminations which
are steps towards reducing them to the
condition of a subject race.
The very
fact that colored people are singled out
and expressly denied by statute all right
to participate in the administration of
the law, as jurors, because of their
color, though they are citizens, and may
be in other respects fully qualified, is
practically a brand upon them, affixed by
the law, an assertion of their inferiority,
and a stimulant to that race prejudice
which is an impediment to securing to
individuals

of

that

race

that

equal

justice which the law aims to secure to
all others.

So,

while opinions like Strauder's did afford equal
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protection to some, most, like Plessv. were so narrow

that the Negro race suffered discrimination.

The extent

of the amendment's application was not broad enough to

give its equal protection of laws clause its needed, full
application which should have been what Justice Harlan's
dissent, in Plessv v. Ferguson, stated: "Our constitution
is color-blind and neither knows or tolerates classes

among citizens."

fairly

Justice Harlan went on to echo some

prophetic

words

about

what

this

ruling

produce.

The present decision, it may well be
apprehended, will not only stimulate ag
gressions, more or less brutal and irri
tating, upon the admitted rights of
colored citizens, but will encourage the
belief that it is possible, by means of
state enactments, to defeat the beneficent
purposes which the people of the United
States had in view when they adopted the
recent amendments of the constitution,
(13,14,15th amendments) by one of which
the blacks of this country were made
citizens

of

the

Unites

States

and

the

states in which they respectively reside,
and whose privileges and immunities, as
citizens, the states are forbidden to

abridge. Sixty million of whites are in
ho danger from the presence here of eight
million

of blacks.

The destines of the

two
races, in
this
country, are
indissolvably linked together, and the
interests of both require that the common

government of all shall not permit the
seeds of race hate to be planted
the sanction of law.

tainly

arouse

race

under

What can more cer

hate,

what

more

certainly create and perpetuate a feeling
of distrust between these races, than state
enactments which, in fact, proceed on the

ground

that

colored

citizens

are

so

inferior and degraded that they cannot be
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would

allowed to sit in piiblic.
Coaches
occupied by white citizens? That as all
will admit, is the real meaning of such
legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.

For the next 58 years the Negro was discriminated

against under the protection of law.
case of Brown v. Board of

a remedy under law.

Not until the 1954

Education of Tooeka was there

But although Brown v.

Board is said

to have rendered a correct conclusion to the case, the

basis on which the conclusion rests, is questionable.

According to Berger, Alexander Bickel, who had the
job of compiling the legislative history of the amendment,

helps us to see why the Court rested its conclusion on
sociological evidence and not law.

Bickel delivered his

memorandum to Justice Frankfurter, for whom he was doing
the research for. It stated:

It is impossible to conclude that the
39th Congress intended that segregation
be abolished;impossible also to conclude
that they foresaw it might be, under the
language they were adopting.
There is
no evidence what ever

showing that for

its sponsors (framers) the civil rights
formula had anything to do with un-^
segregated schools.

Because Of this kind of analysis. Chief Justice Warren
based

the conclusions of the Court on

the unsettled,

changing ground of social science.
Brown V. Board was evidence of a court taking the

law into its own hands.

Its supra-legislative act of
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declaring desegregation illegal under the constitution,
based on nothing other than sociological evidence, was a
mistake.

There

seems

to

be

substantive

evidence

that

the

natural implications of the Natural Rights law supplies a
much firmer basis of law.
the fact that all men are

These implications based on
created equal and are endowed

with life, liberty and the pursuit of

happiness, would

mean people could live where they pleased, go to school
where they pleased, based not on color or race but

intelligence, ambition and content of their character.
The

conclusions

transformation

First, the

of

that

the

underling

can

Fourteenth

be

drawn

Amendment

principles of the

from
are

the

these.

amendment were

exactly the same ones that were used in the constitution;

the

principles

of

equality

and

natural

rights.

But

because of the politically difficult times following the
Civil War, the interpretation of the amendment by the
court

did

Instead

not

afford

equal

protection

to

black

of expanding the amendment•s meaning

men.

based on

the principles of equality nothing was done for over a

half a century, so the problem of inequality persisted
until the Court ruled in Brown v. Board that inequality
would

change

not be tolerated legally.

had

legislative

shifted
branch

in

a

that

But the

bold

way.

had

lead
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process of

It was
the

way

not the
as

the

constitution

envisioned,

and,

secondly,

the

court

had

gained a significant say in social change in a supralegislative capacity.
equality stood

based

on

had

certain

Thirdly the principles on which

subtly changed.

inalienable

rights

scientific evidences, or on human will.
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It was no longer

but

on

societal,

The Transformation Of The First Amendment

Through The Fourteenth Amendment

Looking

at the

First

Amendment,

changed in an innocent enough way.

its meaning

was

The adoption of the

14th Amendment paved the way for the incorporation of
the

First

Amendment.

The

chief

purpose

of the

14th

Amendment, was to insure the freedom of the Negroes and

protect their proper status as citizens of the United
States.

It is true to say that, up to and including

today, it has been used for many other purposes besides
this.

In fact, in Marnell's words, "for the first 70

years of its history, the 14th Amendment was not cited,
in any case directly concerned with a religious issue as
such a guarantee.

But as the due process clause of

the 14th Amendment was used selectively to incorporate

various parts of the Bill of Rights, the time finally
came when the Establishment Clause was also incorporated.

The use of the due process clause to incorporate the
free exercise clause of the First Amendment was alluded

to in a Supreme Court case called Hamilton v. Regents of
the Universitv

of California.

It was mentioned

obiter dictum

only, but the process was already a long

way down the road toward its incorporation.
case hinged on the question of whether a

The Hamilton

Student who had

religious scruples against bearing arms could be
44

in the

compelled, under penalty of expulsion, to take military
drill

in

the

University

of

California.

The

Supreme

Court ruled that while the religious beliefs of Hamilton

were protected by due process of law, he was not being
compelled to attend the University and could assert no
constitutional right to do so without complying with the

State's

requirement

groundwork

now

of

military

set to

address

training.
religious

With

the

issues,

the

Supreme Court was asked to address problems having to do
with the Establishment Clause.

In 1947, a case was brought before the Supreme Court
called

Everson

Ewing.

The

allowed

local

v.

case

Board

of

involved

school

Education

a

New

districts

of

Township

of

Jersey statute that
to

make

rules

and

contracts for the transportation of children to and from

schools.

The township of Ewing authorized reimbursement

to parents of money they had spent for bus transportation
of

their

children

on

regular

public transportation system.
to

buses

operated

by

the

Part of this payment was

parents, who had sent their children to a Catholic

parochial school.

Everson brought a suit against the board challenging
the right of the board to reimburse parents of parochial
school students, contending that the statute violated

the Constitution, specifically the Establishment of reli

gion Clause.

The court, in a five to four decision,
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concluded that the township had not violated the Estab
lishment Clause because, as Justice Black said:
We must be careful in protecting the
citizens of New Jersey against State-est
ablishment churches to be sure that we do

not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey
from extending its general state law
benefits

to

all

its

citizens

without

regard to their religious belief.^®
His argument hinged on the fact that it provided
benefit to the individual and not the State.

With this

decision, two things became particularly clear.
Justice

Black

said

that

the

First

Amendment

First,

meant

at

least this: neither State nor Federal Government can set

up a church.

Because of the incorporation of the First

Amendment by the Fourteenth Amendment, it was possible
to declare the First Amendment open to interpretation by

the

Court.

Secondly,

the

decision

set

forth

the

requirements of the Establishment Clause which Justice
Black said:

The Federal Government cannot pass laws

which aid one religion, aid all reli
gions, or prefer one religion over an
other.

Neither can force nor influence a

person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance.

No tax in

any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may
be
called, or whatever form they may adopt

to teach or practice religion.
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Neither a

state nor the Federal Government can,

openly or secretly, par ticipate in the

affairs of any religious organizations or
groups or vice-versa.
In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect
a wall of separation between Church and
State.

The case opened the doors for numerous other cases

which changed the meaning and application of the First
Amendment.

There

are

two

cases

that

dealt

with

the

concept of released time and dismissed time; the practice
of conducting

building.

In

religious instruction

a

case

called

within

McCollum

v.

the

school

Board

of

Education of Champaign, the question arose whether or not

religious instruction could be given to a student while
in a public classroom.
Justice Black outlined the case and summarized the

majority opinion this way:

This beyond all question is a utilization
of

the

tax-established

and

tax-supp

orted public school system to aid reli

gious groups and to

spread their faith.

And it falls squarely under the ban of
the First Amendment (made applicable to

the States by the i4th Amendment) as we
interpreted it in Everson v. Board of
Education.

Black then turned to the respondent's argument,

which rested on two premises:

that the First Amendment

was intended to forbid only governmental preference for

one religion over another and not governmental assistance
for all religions, and that the Fourteenth Amendment did
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not make the establishment of religion clause of the

First Amendment applicable to the States.

both

arguments.

After

stating that

no

He rejected

hostility

to

religion was intended in his opinion, he concluded, "The
First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion

and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims
free from the other within their respective spheres.

Justice Reed, dissenting in the case, found himself
unable to determine precisely what released time aspect

of the Champaign plan was unconstitutional.

He said:

I conclude that their [courts] teachings
are that any use of a pupil's school
time, whether the use is on or off the
school grounds, with the necessary school
regulations to facilitate attendance,
falls under this ban . .

He then turned to the history of the First Amendment and
found that Thomas Jefferson, as rector of the University

of Virginia for which Madison was one of the visitors,
had

established

university.

a

system

of

He cited the

released

time

at

the

aid that religion receives

from the State in the form of no tax exemption.

He gave

the example of chaplains who invoke the divine blessing
of

Congress

at

each

daily

meeting, the

commissioned

chaplains in the armed forces, the compulsory attendance
at church services at West Point and

Annapolis.

concluded by saying:

The prohibition of enactments respecting
the

establishment of religion does
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not

He

bar every friendly gesture between church
and state. It is not an absolute gesture
between church and state.

absolute

It is not an

prohibition

against

every

conceivable situation where the two may
work together, any more than the other

provision of the First Amendment—free
speech, free press are absolutes . . .
This

court

cannot

be

too

cautious

in

upsetting practices embedded in our
society by many years of experience.
A
state is entitled to have great leeway in
its legislation when dealing with the
important social problems of its popu
lation.
tive

A definite violation of legisla

limits

must

Constitution

be

should

established.

not

be

stretched

The
to

forbid national customs in the way courts
act to reach arrangements to avoid
federal taxation.
Devotion to the great
principle of religious liberty should not
lead us into a rigid interpretation of
the constitutional guarantee that conflicts

with accepted habits of our people. This
is an instance where, for me, the history
of past practices is determinative of the
meaning of a constitiatiohal clause, not a
decorous introllection to the study of
its text.
The judgment should be
affirmed.

In

this

ruling,

established

a

as

in

Everson.

precedent

that

the

Court

subjected

had

the

now

First

Amendment, as it related to the States, to its litmus
test.

Secondly, it had taken a new view, a non-historical

view

of

results

the

First

in

a

Amendment's

much

Establishment Clause.

broader

objective.

This

interpretation

of

view
the

It view contends that the clause

prohibits any governmental support of religion.
ically is definitely skewed.
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Histor

It not only ignores the

overwhelming

social

sentiment

neglects, without comment, the

of

this

time

but

also

origin of the First

Amendment.

The founders' opinion, was that the Amendment

prohibited

a

national

church

and

was

not

willing

to

address State issues about religion.
Four

years

later,

Zorack

v.

Clauson

came

up

for

review by the court, and it modified its stand on released
time.

Justice Douglas distinguished Zorach from McCollum

by emphasizing the differences
In

McCollum.

the

students

between the two plans.

used

government

facilities

while receiving religious instruction; in Zorach, they
did

not.

In

attendance

McCollum. the

machinery

was

state's compulsory

used

school

to make students go to

religion classes, but in Zorach, students could remain
at school in study hall.
But most importantly. Justice Douglas said that the
establishment

prohibition

did

not

preclude

from accommodating the interest of religion.

government

His opinion

was:

. . . we find no constitutional require
ment which makes
it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and
to throw its weight against efforts to
widen the effective scope of religious
influence that would be preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who
do believe.
We are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme

Being.52

The

decision

affirmed

the

50

New

York

statute

as

constitutional.

Within

a

decade,

two

cases

appeared

Supreme Court dealing with prayer.
the

Regents

Praver

case.

The

before

the

The first case was

New

York

State

Board

of

Regents allowed schools to open their days with a recital
of a prayer.

In a six-to-one opinion, the Supreme Court

held the statute to be unconstitutional on the fact that

the Establishment Clause was violated because the prayer

was composed by government officials.

Justice Black

stated that:

... when the power, prestige, and
financial
support of government is
placed behind a particular religious
belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to
the
prevailing officially
approved

religion is plain.^^
Justice Stewart filed the only dissenting opinion,
which followed a pattern of dissent in bases-cited facts
such as references to the Deity in the National Anthem

and the Pledge pf Allegiance, the National Day of
Prayer, chaplains in the service and in penal institu

tions, and finally in the Declaration of Independence.
In the Murrav v. Curlett. Bible reading in public
schools was also found uncpnstitutional.

delivered

the

majcrity

ppinicn

Justice Clark

maintaining

that

the

reading pf the Bible and recitatipn pf the Lprd's Prayer
were

religipus

exercises

prescribed
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as

classroom

activities,

and

Establishment

concluded

Clause.

it

was

Justice

a

violation

Steward

again

of

the

rendered

the dissenting opinion.
This brought up two points which up until that time
had not been expressed.

As

a

matter

Amendment

was

of

history,

adopted

the

solely

First
as

a

limitation upon the newly created national
government.
The events leading to its
adoption strongly suggest that the
Establishment Clause was primarily an
attempt to insure that Congress not only
would be powerless to establish a national
Church,

but

interfere
lishments.

would

with

also

existing

be

unable

State

to

estab

Each State was left free

to

go its own way and pursue its own policy
with respect to religion.
I
accept,
too, the preposition that the 14th
Amendment has somehow absorbed the Estab

lishment Clause, although it is not
without irony that a constitutional
provision evidently designed to leave the
states free to go their own way should
not have become a restriction upon their
autonomy.

He concluded with his second point:
For a compulsory state educational
system so structures a child's life [so]
that if religious exercises are held to
be an impermissible activity in schools,
religion is placed at an artificial and
state-created disadvantage.
And a
refusal to permit religious exercises
thus is seen, not as the realization of
state neutrality but rather as the estab
lishment of a religion of secularism or
at the least, as a government support of
the beliefs of those who think that reli

gious exercises would be conducted
in private.

These two points practically and
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only

constitutionally

were consistent with the founding fathers' intentions.
The court, as it has done to the 14th Amendment, changed

the First Amendment's meaning to fit their particular
bias.

William Marnell, in his book The First Amendment,

wrote;

The First Amendment meant only a fraction
of that [what it means
today] when it
was adopted. States did have established
churches then;
they did pass laws to
aid one religion and to show preference
for one religion over others long after
the adoption of the First Amendment, and
these facts went unchallenged for de
cades.
When it was adopted, the First
Amendment meant precisely what it said:
Congress could make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting
the

free

exercise

thereof.

The

states

were left free to deal with the problem
of religion and religious establishment
as they saw fit, under provision of their
constitutions.^®
In 1970, the new Chief Justice Warren Burger had his
first occasion to render an opinion on the Establishment

Clause.

The Chief Justice portrayed the relationship

between church and state as one of benevolent neutrality.
In

Walz

V.

Tax

constitutionality

Commission.

which

of

tax

property

concerned

exemptions

religious institutions, the Chief Justice said:
The
Establishment
and
Free
Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment are not the

most precisely drawn portions of the
Constitution.
The sweep of the absolute
prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may
have been calculated; but the purpose was
to state an objective not to write a
statute.
In attempting to articulate
the scope of the two Religion Clauses,
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the

given

the
Court's
opinions reflect the
limitations inherent in formulating
general principles on a case-by-case
basis.

The

considerable

internal

inconsistency in the opinions of the
Court derives from what, in retrospect,
may have been too sweeping utterances on
aspects of these clauses that seemed
clear in relation to the particular
cases but have limited meaning as general
principles.
The Court has struggled to
find

a

neutral

course

between

the

two

Religion Clauses, both of which are cast
in absolute terms, and either of which,
if expanded to a logical extreme, would
tend to clash with the other.

The Chief Justice concluded that the Court needed to

adopt a more flexible balancing approach.

That approach

was developed in succeeding decisions of the Burger Court.
In

summary,

the

First

similar transformation

The

First

as

Amendment,

Amendment

has the

has

undergone

Fourteenth

appearing

from

perspective, was meant to do two things.

an

a

Amendment.

historical

First it was

meant to forbid the establishment of a National Church.

Congress could not provide assistance in the establishment

of any church.

This

had only to do with our national

government and was in no way expected to hinder state
governments in their legislative capacities.

Secondly,

in Madison's words, it was designed to:
...

assert

for

ourselves

a

embrace, to profess and to

freedom

to

observe the

Religion which we believe to be Of
divine origin, we cannot deny an equal
freedom

to

those

whose

yet yielded to the
convinced us.^^

minds

evidence
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have

not

which

has

Because of the transformation of the 14th Amendment,
the First Amendment has become vulnerable to the Supreme

Court's

interpretation.

historically

that

It

the

simply

Founding

Fathers'

opinions have not been adhered to.

for

uniformity

Church

and

(to

to

be

Hamilton

wishes

and

In the Court's quest

complete

separation

of

In reviewing the Court's cases since

case

of

1934,

one

became

aware

of

directionless options of the High Court's rulings.

desire

seen

State), it has violated the spirit of the

First Amendment.
the

maintain

has

for

continuity

throughout

its

the

The

rulings

have

resulted in confusion.

There has also been a decreasing trust and a growing

skepticism

by

the

public.

The

incorporation

of

the

First Amendment by the Fourteenth Amendment leaving the
states

vulnerable

to

the

Court's

rulings,

and

the

supra-legislative activity of the Court in a political
area of law, has contributed to the undermining of the
public's confidence.
As

Jefferson

wrote

in

his

Notes

Virginia. "Truth can stand by itself."

on

the

State

of

What is needed

is a return by the Court to the intentions adopted by
the Founding Fathers and enshrined in our Constitution.

The point of this section is to draw attention to
the fact that historically the Constitution's meaning and

principles have undergone a transformation and an outright
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usurpation of its legitimate power and prestige, principly
by a combination of legislative ambivalence and Supreme
Court activism.
the

results

of

The final section will deal with some of
the

transformation

and

constitutional answers to this problem.

56

advance

some

Conclusion

It is a very evident fact that there has been, over

the last 200 years, a reshaping or a transformation of
our American Constitution.

The founders would be greatly

surprised, to say the least, at the type of document
their

Constitution

resembles.

It

is

now

seen

by

a

majority (i.e. William Brennan) as a "lodestar": full of

organically changing words that can mean one thing one
day and something else twenty years later.
or

discarded

It can be

adhered

to

according to the need

of the

times.

This loss of our guarantee has occurred for at

least three apparent reasons. The first is due to the
loss of principle, that at the time of the founding was

taken

for

granted:

of

equality

equality and Natural Rights.

and

natural

rights,

The principle enunciated

in the Declaration of Independence that says that these
truths are self-evident: that all men are created equal

and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights.

That common

knowledge held by the founders has

somehow escaped some of the generations, including our
own.

Instead, a relativistic basis is now undergirding

our constitution, that has little to do with principles
and inalienable rights.

The second reason for the change

in our Consitituion has to do with our legislative

branch's inability to legislate in difficult areas.
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The

Fourteenth

Amendments

use

could

have

been

drastically

altered if the legislature just after the Civil War had

passed laws broadening the rights of blacks instead of
allowing inequality to persist.

principles
unfairness

became
that

indifference.

an

was

The Fourteenth Amendment

instrument

only

of

remedied

oppression

after

and

decades

of

But to fault the legislative efforts in

these areas is only to say more should have been done and
could

have

been done in a constitutional context.

The

problem or fault lays by far at the feet of the judiciary.
The

supralegislative

documented

and

efforts

undeniably

tutional history.

a

by

the

fact of

court

is

American

well

consti

The courts use of power to change the

meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the use of that

amendment to incorporate the rest of the Bill of Rights.

The usurpation of state power, are a few of its most
obvious supralegislative efforts.

It has, through its

misuse caused an erosion of confidence by the public.

Especially in regard to some of its early civil rights
decisions about desegregation.

That is not to say that

desegregation was not a good idea but that it was not
the court's right to be the branch that legislated those
decisions.

These reasons seem to be preeminent in the

transformation process.
Where have these influences led us?

The effects of

these changes do at least two major mischiefs.
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First,

the public confidence in its government begins to erode.

The well

balanced government designed

becomes unbalanced.

The

by the founders

checks and balances devised to

protect the branches from one another, and ultimately to
protect the citizens from the government, do not work
well

as

judicial

they

should.

branch

becomes

dictates policy.

the

example,

nine

the

man

non-elected

tribunal

that

A non-elected, life tenured, almost

completely

unchecked

republican

views

change.

For

as

branch,

becomes

the

not

responsive

catalyst

of

to

our

republican

It finds "new" rights in our constitution, it

says what the constitution really means and then presses
those

views

on

its

citizens.

This happens while the

legislative branch is lagging behind unable or unwilling
to move in difficult areas.

There must be a re-balancing

or realignment of our branches of government as well as a

rediscovery of the principles on which it is to operate.
What needs to be done to ensure the existence of our

regime?

It will require a tremendous change of heart

and

to

mind

see

a

return

to

our

roots.

We

need

to

reestablish the principle of equality as a cornerstone

of our regime.

We need a Supreme Court that will restrain

itself from tampering with issues clearly legislative in

nature and finally a legislative branch willing to take
on its responsibility to be the catalyst in political
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change.

If these suggestions were followed, we would be

an even more tranquil, peaceful nation.
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